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ABSTRACT 
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, involving commercial aircraft 
used as missiles to attack critical assets located within the United States, the U.S 
has worked diligently to enhance its military air defense posture.  Air defense of 
critical U.S. assets and National Special Security Events (NSSE) have been 
enhanced by adding static and proposed deployable Ground Based Air Defense 
(GBAD) systems designed to provide a “last line” of defense from air attacks over 
U.S. soil.  Currently this last line of defense is incorporated with the air and 
maritime military air defense forces providing a “defense in depth” over critical 
assets, but does not support the air and maritime air defense over broader 
ranges of U.S. soil where critical assets do not exist.  As the U.S. continues to 
enhance its air defense posture around critical assets and high priority events 
against terrorist attacks from the air, it is reasonable to assume that the terrorists 
may adjust their strategy for air attacks.  The terrorists may deem it more 
beneficial to attack targets which lack a last line defense.  It is therefore critical to 
examine new means and methods to provide GBAD in areas which may be 
determined to be less lucrative targets.  In addition to the proposed alternate 
terrorist strategy, it is also reasonable to assume that increased security 
measures in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will deter the 
terrorists from attempting another hijacking event; thus forcing them to seek other 
means of attack.  Cruise missiles (CM) are a cheap and effective means of 
causing limited destruction.  Cruise missiles can be programmed to maneuver 
and operate at various altitudes and are small enough to be transported with little 
to no visibility.  A cruise missile in the wrong hands could find its way to within 
miles of the U.S. borders and coastlines.  If launched; a cruise missile could 
engage random targets throughout the U.S., such as malls or schools, and cause 
a major upset to our national security.  Therefore, a defense system should be 
established which incorporates GBAD that is capable of engaging the CM threat 
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One of the major challenges that the U.S. faces today is recognizing the 
necessity to restructure the homeland missile defense posture.  It is logical to 
assume that current missile defense programs, in concept, are adequate to 
counter any long range threats from North Korea or Iran, but what is less obvious 
is the necessity to design a program to engage a more irregular threat such as 
Cruise Missiles (CM’s) which could potentially be launched from near-by borders 
or sea shores.  
The post 9-11 United States has been challenged to recognize new 
perceptions of threats to homeland security.  Following the break up of the Soviet 
Union, much of the technology, expertise and in some cases the raw material 
necessary to create hostile missile systems, have found their way into the hands 
of state and non-state actors whose ultimate goals for the use of such technology 
may threaten U.S. interests and our national security.  One aspect of the 
American defense posture which did not change with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union was our doctrine concerning threats from the air.  U.S. planners, as well as 
citizens in general, had become complacent in the idea that air attacks could only 
be executed from distant areas, and that our military sensors and defensive 
systems were adequate to counter such a threat.   
The necessity for a defense against threats from the air was proven on 
September 11, 2001 when short range friendly (to clarify; friendly in this context 
refers only to the fact that the aircraft could not be identified as enemy aircraft) air 
attacks became a viable tactic for our enemies and exposed a weakness in our 
defensive barriers.  In particular there were no Ground Based Air Defense 
(GBAD) systems in place which could have served as a “last resort” line of 
defense against the hijackers.  To be certain there were plenty of Air assets 
which were quickly scrambled by order of the North American Aerospace 
Defense (NORAD) Command, but their efforts, while noble, were not effective in 
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preventing the destruction of a portion of the Pentagon and the two World Trade 
Centers.  “Exercise planners assumed that the aircraft would originate from 
outside the United States, allowing time to identify the target and scramble 
interceptors… the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the US- 
and using them as guided missiles- was [SIC] not recognized by NORAD before 
9/11.”1 Communications between organizations and defensive operating systems 
were virtually non-existent, and what little military response was only rendered 
from U.S. military aircraft.  Doctrinally, there was no Ground Based Air Defense 
(GBAD) mandated to respond to this type of threat. 
U.S. policy makers and citizens are in a critical state of emergency with 
regards to national security.  The time has come to review five decades of cold 
war defense posturing designed to deter and negate global strategic threats 
which were distant and visible, and incorporate the proper doctrine to defend 
against asymmetric threats from both state sponsored authoritarian regimes 
capable of mass destruction and small decentralized terrorist cells capable of 
planning autonomous, small scale-grand effect-attacks on U.S. soil.  Converting 
our national defense from a cold war posture to counter the modern asymmetric 
threat requires much more than revamping policy and rethinking strategy; it 
requires a complete retooling of both civil and military national infrastructure.  
New and more sophisticated technology will be required to prevent, detect and 
defend against short, medium and long range threats.  There exists a need to 
improve our current weapons sensor and shooter capabilities.    
It is our position that a properly placed GBAD asset such as the U.S. 
Patriot or Avenger/Stinger units could have served as a last line of defense from 
an air threat over U.S. soil and could have, at best, minimized the loss of life on 
the ground. GBAD concepts and doctrine can eliminate confusion in an otherwise 
confused combat environment.  Certain safe guards such as restricted and no-fly 
zones, as well as Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) codes and visual identification 
enable ground units to decipher enemy targets for possible engagement.  In the 
                                            
1 9/11 Commission Report 17. 
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case of 9-11, had a restricted zone been established around those critical areas, 
anything flying in the designated airspace may have been engaged over water or 
less densely populated areas by GBAD assets.  Of course air defense of the U.S. 
is not limited to just Air Breathing Threats (ABT)’s such as that on 9-11, but also 
to the possible future defense against threats such as low grade CM’s.  
B. PROBLEM 
The U.S. faces a new threat to its own national and border security.  The 
new enemy is innovative, adaptive and is not constrained by international rules of 
engagement or political reprisals.  This threat has demonstrated its capability to 
seek out and expose America’s security weaknesses through methodical 
analysis and observation.  The enemy counts on U.S. strategy and restrictive 
policies to enhance their ability to exploit gaps in our national defense posture.  
In addition the enemy uses our misunderstanding of their capabilities and intent 
to their advantage in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks.  Currently the 
U.S. assumptions about terrorist tactics are that they will seek to strike well 
known critical infrastructure targets or popular special events.  Their intent in this 
case would be to cause a mass of casualties and destruction in order to create 
large scale effects of fear and confusion.  Thus current planning for terrorist’s 
attacks from the air assumes that the terrorists will attack only densely populated 
areas with major financial, military or industrial infrastructures critical to U.S. 
survivability, or National Special Security Events (NSSE)’s such as the 
Superbowl or Olympics. 
While there are a myriad of Air Force, Naval, Coast Guard and intelligence 
forces allocated to support homeland defense, those assets are limited in their 
capabilities to cover every inch of U.S. territory.  Furthermore, the U.S. borders 
and coastlines are expansive and porous.  If the combination of those forces 
should fail to prevent a “leaker” air threat from penetrating U.S. air space there is 
not an adequate amount of GBAD forces to provide for that critical “last line” of 
defense.   
A couple of problems exist in supporting this last line defense.  The first is 
that the GBAD resources, which are comprised mainly of short, medium, and 
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high range Surface to Air Missiles (SAM’s) such as Patriot, Avenger and 
SLAMRAAM are assigned primary missions to support their regional and Global 
Combatant Commands (GCC’s) such as Central Command (CENTCOM), 
European Command (EUCOM) and Pacific Command (PACOM).  Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD), who have the mission of Homeland Defense and Air Defense against 
air and CM threats, have a very limited short and medium GBAD capability.   
A secondary problem is that the current GBAD systems are designed to 
provide only point defense of specific critical assets.  In other words, those 
systems can only provide for the defense of specific points such as oil fields, 
buildings, and ports.  This type of defense, if allocated for homeland defense, 
requires a tailorable, packaged force with a designated mission to protect a 
specific asset in a designated time frame.  This strategy can be supported by 
designating certain Air and Missile Defense (AMD) units, dispersed throughout 
Continental U.S. (CONUS) Regional Air Defense Sectors (RADS) to provide 
GBAD for specific critical assets or National Special Security Events (NSSE), but 
do not cover areas which are not assigned as critical assets such as schools, 
malls and other minor metropolitan facilities. 
GBAD provides an “in depth” level of air defense that makes targets less 
desirable to our enemies.  Areas without the added GBAD may offer a less than 
optimal defense design and expose potential seams for terrorists to target. This 
may present a viable secondary strategy for a terrorist who may be willing to 
strike smaller and less profound targets in order to prove that they can still attack 
Americans on U.S. soil thereby shaking the confidence of many Americans in 
their government’s ability to provide for their safety. It is reasonable to predict 
that an enemy, who believes so deeply in martyrdom, can afford to expend 
squad size resources to engage less critical and sparsely populated U.S. cities 
and towns using low grade CM’s to strike random targets along our coasts and 
borders. 
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The belief that the terrorists will continue to strike large critical 
infrastructure targets, as well as seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense 
by striking random low value targets, seem to be viable enemy strategies.  It is 
therefore necessary to examine which strategies are most viable and feasible for 
the terrorists with regard to cost versus payoff.  Accordingly it is critical to 
examine what may be the best strategy for the U.S. to provide GBAD against one 
or all of the terrorists most viable strategies. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
There is a need to assume that terrorist organizations will continue to plan 
future operations that involve the destruction of large industrial, financial, military 
or otherwise critical U.S. assets in order to cause mass chaos among the 
American populace.  It is likely that these plans may include the use of CM’s.  It 
is therefore assumed that the U.S. air defense posture should incorporate 
measures to mitigate that threat with forces operating in the air, sea and ground.  
It is assumed that the ground based defensive effort will serve as the “last line” 
effort in the order of battle or that it will provide coverage where the air and 
maritime assets otherwise can not.  Given the expansive borders of the U.S., it 
can be assumed that the GBAD designated for defense should be robust, rapidly 
deployable and tailored to mission requirements to provide point defense of such 
critical assets. 
There is also a need to assume that the terrorist will seek to analyze 
current U.S. efforts to defend against attacks against their larger industrial 
complexes and that there may be little payoff in time, money and energy in 
planning such attacks versus their ability to be successful in executing them.  It is 
likely that terrorists could seek to destroy softer targets which are not afforded 
adequate air defense resources such as random towns, schools or malls.  In 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I, Iraqi militants launched several Ababil-100, and 
Al Samoud missiles toward its own Southern region and Kuwait.  After realizing 
that their high value targets were well defended by U.S. and Kuwaiti Patriot 
Missile defenses, they launched one successful strike at a soft target.  According 
to a CNN report dated March 29, 2003, an Iraqi FAW-200, or seersucker cruise 
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missile impacted the Souq Sharq Mall where civilians were shopping and 
attending movies. The attack was executed without detection from friendly forces 
and thus, no alarm was sounded prior to engagement. The report went on to 
quote the Kuwaiti Information Minister, Ahmad Fahd al-Sabah as stating “This 
kind of missile usually it [SIC] flies between 20-25 meters [66-83 feet] over the 
land. For that, there is no defense system that can reach it.  The Minister went on 
to note that there were three versions of the FAW which were capable of 
engagements as far as 143 miles from its intended target.”2  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that an adaptive enemy may choose this exact same 
tactic to launch an attack undetected within the borders of Mexico, Canada, or 
from a vessel outside of our coast lines at a non-specified target.  Thus there 
remains a need to develop and incorporate a GBAD system capable of defeating 
such a threat; one that can provide area defense of entire regions in addition to 
specific critical assets.  
We recognize that there are several components of homeland security 
and homeland defense of equal and perhaps greater importance.  That being 
said the purpose of this thesis will focus solely on homeland defense rather than 
homeland security; we will be focusing only on cruise missile threats to U.S. soil.  
In order to clarify the narrow focus of our study it is important, first, to distinguish 
the difference between homeland security and homeland defense since the two 
terms can seem synonymous.  Homeland Security, as defined in the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, is “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur.” The Department 
of Homeland Security is the lead Federal agency for homeland security. In 
addition, its responsibilities extend beyond terrorism to preventing, preparing for, 
responding to, and recovering from a wide range of major domestic disasters and 
other emergencies. The definition of Homeland Defense is: The protection of 
United States territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure  
                                            
2 CNN.com/World Missile Hits Kuwait City Mall.  Saturday March 29th 2003.  Retrieved on 4 
October 2006, from 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/28/sprj.irq.kuwait.explosion/index.html.  
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against external threats and aggression.  It also includes routine, steady state 
activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for 
action if deterrence fails.3 
Simply put, the mission of homeland security is primarily conducted by the 
civil services; Police, FBI, CIA, NTSB etc… Their job is to use intelligence and 
police actions to seek out and defeat the threat before it is effectively operational.  
The role of homeland defense is primarily a military one conducted in concert 
with all branches of service.  Their job is to prepare to defend the homeland 
when security measures have failed to detect a threat that is now imminent. Both 
of these elements work together in the realm of intelligence sharing and also 
consequence management in the event that a terrorist attack is completed.  In 
addition the U.S. military can be called to assist civil services humanitarian 
efforts.  The role of GBAD is a very small, but important function of homeland 
defense.  In the worst case scenario however, properly placed GBAD can serve 
a most critical function as a final line of defense. 
D. THESIS 
The impetus for this thesis will be to make clear that the current U.S. air 
defense posture can be enhanced by using GBAD systems to provide a multi 
tiered, “defense in depth” designed to support and optimize the abilities of current 
air and maritime resources designated for homeland defense.  This thesis will 
focus on threats which originate from outside of our borders and coastlines which 
intend to launch short range attacks using CM’s and non-conventional tactics. 
We will demonstrate that the terrorists will alter their strategy of attacking large 
critical targets and events in order to enhance their probability of success versus 
payoff.  Thus, we will demonstrate the need to implement a GBAD system 
capable of reacting quickly to, and successfully engaging a “no notice” CM 
attack.  Rather than inventing a new technology, we seek to optimize what 
resources are already in operation or emerging in concept.    
                                            
3 Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, 





In the ensuing chapters we examine the methods and process necessary 
to optimize GBAD in support of homeland defense.  Using the Systems 
Engineering and Design Process (SEDP), we identify and define the problem that 
currently exists; identify the stakeholders; conduct a needs analysis; and identify 
alternatives for the current U.S. air defense posture.  We use game theory to 
examine two strategies terrorist may use to employ threats from the air, and two 
strategies the U.S. may deem feasible to counter those threats. 
We analyzed current weapons systems which are designed to intercept 
CM’s, and review the current strategy and policies for homeland defense against 
air and missile threats.  We also assessed the role of GBAD in the layered 
defense posture in countering threats from the air.  We assessed the GBAD role 
as it stands currently and investigated future plans to enhance air and missile 
defense, and proposed recommendations that will optimize the U.S. air defensive 
capabilities. 
Our research examined the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the 
defense of critical assets, as well as that of the general populace, to determine 
optimal placement of weapons systems and forces. We looked beyond what 
systems are currently funded for Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense 
(HACMD) and interviewed engineers involved in the future warfare and 
technology battle labs, in order to determine the available depth of assets and 
resources available for HACMD.  
We looked at the current force structure to assess the strength and 
capabilities to deploy GBAD forces in support of the CAL\DAL.  Providing rapidly 
deployable air and missile defense forces throughout the several CAL’s in the 
U.S. requires the availability of assets with a designated mission with 
predetermined coordinates who are well rehearsed through the process of battle 
drill exercises and deployments. 
Our analysis also looked at the long and short range capabilities of our 
current GBAD weapons systems and examines the effectiveness of those 
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weapons in testing and evaluations.  We sought out emerging concepts and 
technologies such as the Low Cost Interceptors (LCI)’s which may provide a 
static long term defense across all of our borders and seaboards.  Such 
technologies and systems may be available at low cost to the force provider.  In 
addition to lower cost, these systems could also provide an element of security 
that is less obtrusive to the civilian populace.   
Our resulting data analysis is intended to provide a general 
recommendation to the public for optimizing Ground Based Air Defense systems, 
and personnel to support Homeland Defense in its war against terrorist 
aggression from the air.  Our recommendation will be based on our research and 
is not intended to formulate policy, but rather to identify an issue and provide 
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II. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. IDENTIFIED NEED 
The post 9-11 U.S. has made tremendous strides in improving 
communications and information sharing among the intelligence agencies.  The 
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (HLS) and the stand-up 
of Northern Command (NORTHCOM), has demonstrated the value that our 
government has placed on our security.  The National Transportation and Safety 
Board (NTSB) and Transportation Security Agency (TSA) have excruciatingly 
improved security measures at all U.S. airports.  While these steps have not 
been in vain, they can be viewed as merely a palliative to the American people 
from the reality of the terrorist threat.  The current HLD strategy for defense 
against air threats focuses more directly toward the type of attack that has 
already occurred and does not focus enough effort on what new type of air 
attacks may be viable for terrorists.  
This mentality is based on an assumption that the terrorist are myopic in 
their strategy and have limited imagination and resources.  The more obvious 
point is that the attacks of 9-11 were successful because the terrorist had spent 
years studying where the U.S. was not focusing its security efforts.  Thus, in 
determining a successful defensive strategy to protect U.S personnel, 
infrastructure and forces from enemy asymmetric air attacks, there is a need to 
evaluate which military systems can provide for the best defense of probable 
targets such as critical assets as well as the general U.S. populace.  
In assuming that terrorists may not seek to use the same strategy of 
attack, by using hijacked aircraft, we should also assume that they may seek to 
explore a different style of weapon.  If our assumption -that hijacking an aircraft is 
no longer a viable option for terrorists- is true, the aircraft may no longer be their 




weapon that has the capability of engaging the U.S. populace, critical 
infrastructure and forces on our own soil, from distances well outside of our 
borders and coastlines.   
In recognizing the need to establish a viable defense system against a CM 
threat, it is critical to evaluate and analyze what type of assets terrorists may 
wish to target.  Common thought dictates that terrorists wish to attack high value 
targets which are representative of American culture. More to the point however, 
is the fact that the lasting effects of destroying major economic, information, 
military and energy facilities has a far greater impact than that of the destruction 
of the facility itself. Therefore, critical assets and infrastructure will continue to 
have priority in the defensive order of battle and national defense resources.  In 
2002 the Department of Defense released an executive report regarding the 
importance of protecting critical U.S. infrastructure stating “The need to protect 
critical infrastructure is recognized at the highest levels of the National Command 
Authority. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all published detailed guidance 
requiring the Defense community to establish effective programs for such a 
protection. But even without directives requiring formal CIP programs, protecting 
critical assets is an obvious fundamental requirement for all defense activities. In 
conventional wars, critical assets have always been considered lucrative targets. 
They become even more so in an asymmetric conflict where small 
unconventional forces seek to inflict maximum damage with minimal resources.”4  
Another important issue concerning national defense planners is the ability 
to provide for the common defense of all U.S. citizens.  The idea that every 
American citizen should feel protected at home and in our daily lives is written in 
our constitution. “We the People of the United States, in order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish justice, and ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
common defense… establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”5  
                                            
4 Department of Defense. Critical Infrastructure Protection, Executive Report 2002. 
5 Preamble to the United States Constitution. Retrieved on 16 November 2006 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/preamble_to_the_united_states_constitution  
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While logic dictates that the destruction of critical assets can negatively impact a 
greater percentage of the populace than the destruction of an isolated segment 
of society with no economic outreach, a successful strike of such a segment 
could damage the confidence of the U.S. citizens and their faith in the 
government to provide for their protection against all foreign threats. 
It is clear that there is a need for the U.S. to consider a line of defense that 
is capable of engaging cruise missile threats which may elude both air and 
maritime defense forces.  This “last line” of defense needs to be capable of 
defending the U.S. civilian populace and U.S. critical infrastructure, as well as 
provide force protection from irregular air strikes on U.S. sovereign territory.  Our 
efforts here focus on the need for a defense from a CM threat, which has evaded 
detection and engagement from the current system in place, designed to engage 
such threats.  All criteria evaluated in the analysis are thus subjected to an 
assumption of a failure in existing systems to defeat such a threat, not a 
presumption of such failure.  
B. THE CRUISE MISSILE THREAT 
CM’s present a more unique threat than conventional aircraft because 
they are fast, low flying and maneuverable. Most threats from the air are detected 
by ground based radar sensors looking up.  Cruise missiles have the ability, not 
only to fly below the scope of these radars, but also the ability to maneuver 
around natural and urban terrain.  Defense from this type of threat requires the 
use of sensors with the ability to look down and around wide areas.  What is 
even more daunting is the ability of non-state actors to acquire and transport 
CM’s with relative ease.  “Cruise missiles are cheaper to build and buy than 
ballistic missiles, making them attractive to countries with less advanced 
militaries and to non-state actors as well. Tracking proliferation of cruise missiles 
is difficult because the materials and technology involved have multiple uses. 
They are also easy to hide and transport/relocate because of their smaller size. 
Once launched, these low-flying missiles are especially difficult to detect/engage 
in the clutter of ground objects. The restrictions of line-of-sight, due to the earth’s 
curvature, on surface-based sensors also make detection and engagement 
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extremely difficult; that is, a low-flying CM cannot be seen until it breaks  
the sensor’s horizon, usually at close range.6”   
Specifications of the CM are not the only attributes that make them 
attractive to terrorists.  Our own fortification of critical U.S. assets will likely make 
CM’s more appealing to the enemy due to our over emphasis on countering a 
slower moving threat from a higher elevation.  “Cruise missiles have a number of 
characteristics that make them desirable as weapons; the dominance of US air 
forces and the emphasis on US ballistic missile defenses may further increase 
their attractiveness. As a result, the United States and its allies are likely to face 
a growing cruise missile challenge, from their employment in a future regional 
contingency to their use by terrorists against the US homeland.”7  According to 
some recent studies converting Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) into Land 
Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) can be done fairly easily with off the shelf 
technology and modest foreign assistance used to enhance the CM guidance 
and propulsion systems.  Iraq’s Al Faw CM system, which was responsible for 
the 2003 attack on a Kuwaiti mall, was one such endeavor.  It is believed that 
with substantial foreign help, that Iran could convert its silkworms into LACM’s in 
the next three to five years.8 
C. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS 
The current stakeholders in the concern for defense from CM attacks are 
the same as the overall stakeholders in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The 
Department of Defense (DoD) has overall responsibility for the protection of U.S 
citizens and infrastructure.  Responsibility for carrying out the planning and 
operational side of CM defense is divided among several agencies. 
 
 
                                            
6 National Security Watch. “The Cruise Missile Threat: Prospects for Homeland Defense.” 
The Institute of Land Warfare; Association of the United States Army. 2425 Wilson Blvd Arlington, 
VA 22201. NSW 06-03. 2. 1 June 2006. 
7 Thomas G. Mahnken. The Cruise Missile Challenge. Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assesments. March 2005, 2-3.  www.csbaonline.org 




NORTHCOM is responsible for conducting operations to deter, 
prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the U.S. its territories, and 
interests within the assigned area of responsibility. NORTHCOM, at the request 
of the President of the United States (POTUS) or Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) can provide military assistance to civilian agencies for consequence 
management.9 
b. NORAD  
NORAD had two primary missions: 1) Aerospace Warning- monitor 
man-made objects in space and detect, validate and warn of attack against North 
America, and provide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment 
(IT/WAA) to U.S. and Canadian Governments.  2) Aerospace Control- provide 
surveillance and control of North American airspace.  Detect identify, monitor and 
if necessary take appropriate action against manned or unmanned air-breathing 
vehicles approaching North America.10 
c. JTAMDO  
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) is 
chartered to plan, coordinate, and oversee Joint Air and Missile Defense (AMD) 
requirements, joint CONOPS, operational architectures, and development of the 
Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) roadmap.  They are responsible 
for evaluating systems and emerging technologies… to counter aircraft, cruise 




                                            
9 NORAD J-5 “Future Concepts and Capabilities” Power Point Brief dated 18 January 2006.   
10 Ibid. 
11 JOINT STAFF FY 2005 Budget Estimates Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E), Defense-Wide Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification. February, 2004.  
16 
d. MDA  
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) mission is to “Develop and field an 
integrated BMDS capable of providing a layered defense for the homeland, 
deployed forces, friends, and allies against ballistic missiles of all ranges in all 
phases of flight.”12 
e. SMDC  
Support for Joint Testing and Evaluation of HACMD and 
Deployable HACMD (D-HACMD) is the responsibility of the Space and Missile 
Defense Command (SMDC), Future Warfare Center (FWC), Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC).   
f. 32nd/263rd AAMDC  
Responsibility for the operational side of GBAD in support of 
HACMD was initiated by the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command 
(AAMDC), and is currently transferring responsibility to the National Guards’ 
263rd AAMDC.13  All of these organizations are working diligently to combine all 
of their HACMD resources into one cooperative family of sensors and shooters. 
2. Service Systems and Responsibilities 
a. Army  
The Army is the lead service for development of a ground-based 
defense against air-breathing threats, including aircraft and missiles: 
• The Patriot Capability 3 (PAC-3) missile, used during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, can intercept and destroy incoming cruise and ballistic missiles. 
An extended-range version of the PAC-3 interceptor is under development. PAC-
3 defense is limited to relatively small areas, or point defenses. 
• The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), jointly 
undertaken by the American, German and Italian militaries, will be operational in 
                                            
12 Missile Defense Agency Mission Statement retrieved on 19 November 2006 from 
http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/aboutus.html.  
13 Interview with COL Nanette Mueller, Deputy G-3 for Integrated Air and Missile Defense, 
SMDC, Peterson, AFB, CO. 13 November 2006. 
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the post-2010 timeframe. MEADS will provide 360- degree surveillance and 
tracking against airborne and ballistic missile threats. MEADS technology will be 
integrated into the force(s) as it becomes available. Like PAC-3, MEADS will be 
limited to small-area or point defenses. 
• The Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted 
Sensor (JLENS) is an aerial sensor that will detect and identify cruise missiles 
and other low-flying objects at greater ranges and provide engagement-quality 
data to shooters. JLENS provides sustainable, long-term tracking and 
identification, as it can remain airborne for many days at a time at a relatively low 
cost. This system will combine with PAC-3 and MEADS to greatly increase 
intercept range, thereby allowing in-depth defense of larger areas. 
• The Army’s Short-Range Air-Defense (SHORAD) system will also 
have a role in CMD. SHORAD has the ability to fire surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs) from various platforms to engage all air-breathing targets, albeit at very 
close ranges.14 
b. Navy  
The Navy also has extensive experience in defending against low-
flying weapons like cruise missiles. The Aegis Combat System, the E-2C 
Hawkeye aircraft and the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) make up 
the Navy’s main CMD capability. 
• The Aegis Combat System is used primarily in the fleet air and 
missile protection mode but can provide limited shore-based asset defense. 
• CEC is a sensor networking technology integrated on Navy assets 
to allow the merging of radar data from many different CEC-equipped sources. 
With the completed installation of CEC in the fleet, all members of battle groups 
will have an integrated air picture, resulting in enhanced reaction time and 
weapons performance. Weapons will also be able to engage more quickly and at 
greater ranges than when they relied on local sensors. 
                                            
14 National Security Watch. “The Cruise Missile Threat: Prospects for Homeland Defense.” 1 
June 2006, 3.  
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• The airborne E-2C Hawkeye detects long-range, over-the-horizon 
cruise missiles and directs fighter intercept of the hostile tracks at greater ranges. 
These three capabilities combined can provide a comprehensive, 
single integrated air picture that greatly extends the detection, tracking and 
engagement of cruise missiles.15 
c. Air Force  
The Air Force traditionally has been the lead in defending the 
homeland from the air. Today, the Air Force uses surface and airborne sensors 
data-linked to airborne interceptors and their air-to-air missiles. The fighter 
interceptors and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) are the 
foundation of the Air Force’s current CMD capabilities. 
• The fighter interceptors carry air-to-air missiles. The F/A-22, the 
replacement for the F-15, is designed (in addition to other missions) to defend 
against cruise missiles at home and in forward areas. 
• AWACS can provide surveillance data on low-flying objects in the 
range of most cruise missiles, detect and identify potential threats and interact 
with fighters to intercept and neutralize the threat.16 
D. CURRENT GBAD ANALYSIS AGAINST CM 
While the prospect of acquiring CM’s for an attack against the U.S. may 
seem to be a viable alternative for terrorists, some experts estimate that the time 
effort and money that is required to acquire and launch a CM is not worth the 
ultimate payoff they wish to achieve.  For instance, if terrorists wished to launch 
an attack in a rural area which is not well protected, the amount of destruction 
they wish to achieve with a CM may be as extensive as using a backpack full of 
C4, or some home made explosives.  There are several steps in the acquisition 
process that the terrorists would have to go through to gain the proper material 
for a CM, many of which would not go unnoticed by intelligence assets at home 
                                            
15 National Security Watch. “The Cruise Missile Threat: Prospects for Homeland Defense.” 1 
June 2006, 3.  
16 Ibid 
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and abroad.  If terrorists could obtain the material they would then need to obtain 
the resources to transport the material which is also difficult to do without being 
detected.  And finally, if the acquisition and transport of the CM were successful, 
there are several surveillance and security levels the terrorists would have to 
negotiate to launch a strike. 
Captain Fred Midgette, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) liaison to NORAD/NORTHCOM, notes that it 
would be difficult for a non-state actor to acquire a seaborne vessel, because it 
would have to come by way of a state flagged vessel, and that no country would 
be willing to run that risk with the U.S.  Furthermore, in the option that terrorists 
may attempt to steal a vessel to achieve their objectives, there would likely be a 
report filed and they would be an anomaly among or outside the normal 
commerce shipping lanes.  While the DHS USCG LNO deems the possibility of 
terrorists launching a CM from a sea vessel as unlikely, he does not think it is 
impossible.  Osama Bin Laden’s connections to questionable foreign freighter 
companies could offer opportunities to pose as a bogus shipping company and 
send a leaker vessel within range of U.S. coastlines.  Capt Midgette further 
stipulates that normal off shore supply vessels would not have the ability to make 
the journey from overseas.  However, a coastal freighter could make the journey 
from distant countries.17   
A February 2006 briefing conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology- Lincoln Labs (MIT-LL) assessed several air threat types, and their 
ability to attack the U.S.  Their assessment of the CM attack was that it would be 
both hard for the terrorists to execute such an attack and that it would be difficult 
for current U.S. sensors and shooters to defend against such an attack.  They 
assessed the defense of such an attack as moderate to hard due to the CM low 
radar cross section.  The study further examined seven categories of our active 
defense capabilities in point and area defense: Enhanced Battle Management 
                                            
17 interview with Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) liaison to NORAD/NORTHCOM, Captain Fred Midgette, and Commander Enseign, 
NORAD/NORTHCOM, Peterson, AFB, CO, 14 November 2006. 
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Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I); Train 
for National Cruise Missile Defense (NCMD) Mission; Local air surveillance; 
Maritime surveillance; Offshore air surveillance; Fast take off armed Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicle UCAV; and Air directed Surface to Air Missiles (SAM)/GBAD. 
The assessment noted that GBAD could provide adequate point and area 
defense with good active defense identification as being critical.18 
E. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
1. Scheme of Attack 
The general scheme of a CM attack consists of rogue actors using non-
conventional means to strike an unsuspecting and unwilling participant in an area 
where they appear to be most vulnerable.  A non-state actor or terrorists who 
may attempt such an air attack on the U.S. can likely presume that they will face 
a formidable and multi tiered air defense.  Therefore we can assume that the 
terrorists will be forced to create innovative and imaginative techniques for 
attacking the U.S. and that their weapons will lack sophistication; at least so far 
as obtaining any traceable or accountable resources and material.  A typical 
scenario may consist of a CM launched from a small sea going vessel. 
A non-state actor with connections to illegitimate or bogus overseas 
shipping companies could acquire a coastal freighter and load it with 
disassembled raw material components designed to build a CM.  The non-state 
actor could then assign a small group of terrorists to take command of the vessel, 
infiltrate the crew, or hijack the freighter prior to embarkation.  Once in route, the 
crew may attempt to stay within normal commercial trafficking lanes and run the 
risk of being detected and interdicted prior to coming within launching range of 
the U.S.  If accurate intelligence, or random searches result in the CM being 
detected prior to launch, then the terrorist plan is thwarted.   
If the terrorists manage to leak through the maritime defenses and begin 
to come within range of the U.S., they would then need to begin procedures to 
assemble and launch the CM.  If detected during this phase the U.S. military 
                                            
18 L.O. Upton, MIT, Lincoln Labs, “Homeland Defense Threat Assessment,” Homeland Air 
Defense Study/ Executive Summary, February, 2006. Slides 6 and 10. 
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forces could scramble jet fighters and AWACS sensors to defend against the 
threat by either interdicting prior to launch, or intercepting the CM after the 
launch.  The ability to detect and defeat a CM launch in this phase is greater in 
areas of the U.S. which already have defended critical assets or around NSSE’s.  
If the terrorists could manage to come within roughly 100 miles of the U.S. 
coastline, avoiding all methods of detection and engagement from the maritime 
and air forces, a successful CM launch could provide only minutes for a military 
force to detect and engage the CM before it strikes U.S. soil. 
Given this scenario, the terrorists have a choice in determining which 
targets may be the most profitable.  One may be to conduct an attack similar to 
that of 9-11 which is designed to disrupt major U.S. operational infrastructure and 
create mass devastation.  A successful operation of this sort could prove to be a 
high payoff operation for the terrorists, but at an extremely high risk to their 
probability of success.  Another method may be to strike a random target 
anywhere along the coasts or borders.  This type of operation may not provide 
the same payoff value for the terrorists, but may offer a higher probability of 
success. 
F. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The concept of defensive operations for U.S. planners should involve the 
ability for our civil and military forces to, 1) detect the threat and determine its 
identity; 2) provide a defense against the threat through the use of tactics which 
may thwart the ability of the threat to continue its mission; and 3) when all other 
efforts fail, the U.S. should have a capability to defeat the threat at a distance 
which maintains the safety of the U.S. populace, our critical assets and the force 
employed to provide the defense.  Figure 1 depicts the functional flow of such an 








































do not detect threat
U.S. Air and GBAD 
forces are alerted














sensors sharing common 
operating picture w/ real 









U.S. jets track CM 
(Sensors and VID)
U.S. GBAD  tracks CM 
(Sensors and VID)





















Figure 1.   Functional flow diagram of a possible cruise missile strike. 
 
The above chart demonstrates a multi tiered defense scenario where joint 
military forces are conducting synchronized operations.  This scenario also 
includes an organic “last line” GBAD.  GBAD’s role is demonstrated in phase 
three “Defeat”, to provide ground based sensor and shooter support in a joint 
environment.  Since this particular defense design is providing support over U.S. 
soil, the role of GBAD is to be the last resort for engagement against a CM 
threat; that is when the threat has eluded all other maritime and air combat 
systems. This differs from the conventional wartime role of GBAD which is to 
augment and share battle space with other combat operating systems in which 
“shooters” are tasked to engage targets based on their optimal capabilities and 
position with regard to the threat. 
G. SYSTEM OBJECTIVES 
GBAD systems involved in the last line of the “Defeat” phase need to be 
capable of sharing data with the air and maritime defenses and should be 
capable of engaging enemy air targets at distances which would reduce or 
eliminate collateral damage over U.S. interests in order to, 1) protect the lives of 
23 
U.S. citizens; 2) protect critical U.S. infrastructure; 3) protect U.S. forces and 
equipment. The “Defeat” phase is the most sensitive in the order of battle as this 
is the phase where the threat comes closest to U.S. soil.  In order to defeat the 
threat and reduce the probability of fratricide we have identified four sub-
functions which are critical in GBAD operations when attempting to defeat the 
CM attack.   
First the system must be capable of providing a Wide Area of Surveillance 
(WAS) that can detect a threat far enough out to provide timely intelligence about 
a Track of Interest (TOI).  This is critical to ensuring that all agencies monitoring 
U.S. airspace have situational awareness and the ability to share information 
which identifies the TOI.  Once a TOI is tracked, the system must be capable of 
obtaining a Positive Combat Identification (PID).  This is critical in preventing an 
accidental shoot down of non-hostile tracks.  Additionally, the system should offer 
a ready force capable of deploying and operating CM defense systems in a rapid 
manner.  This issue takes on a different meaning when the combat operations 
are taking place over U.S. soil.  Optimal placement for some GBAD systems may 
intrude on the privacy of some U.S. citizens.  Therefore it is important to optimize 
the use of government and/or public property which is least obtrusive to the 
general public. Finally, the system should be operationally feasible in order for 
the system to be successfully employed and operated.  The following is a break 
down of the objectives hierarchies which are necessary to defeat a CM attack: 
 
1. Defeat the Cruise Missile Attack 
 
Figure 2.    Objectives Hierarchy, Top Level Function 
 
 












a. Wide Area Surveillance  
 
Figure 3.   Objectives Hierarchy, Sub-function Wide Area Surveillance 
 
The first important aspect of combating a CM threat is the systems’ 
ability to detect and track a possible threat.  Given the cruise missile’s ability to 
launch from a low profile platform and maneuver below upward looking sensors, 
it is critical to establish a system with multiple sensors both ground based and 
airborne which are capable of constant surveillance around North American 
territory.  Another important feature is that the airborne and ground based 
sensors produce a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) in order to communicate 
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b. Positive Combat Identification  
 
Figure 4.   Objectives Hierarchy, Sub-function Positive Combat Identification 
 
Once a possible TOI is located, it is critical to assign an 
identification as a friend or foe track.  Since the U.S. is typically not a combat 
theater the amount of normal friendly commercial and private air traffic is greatly 
increased.  Therefore, it is important for the system to be able to delineate 
normal air traffic from potential hostile tracks, by positively identifying friendly 
tracks in order to reduce the clutter of a SIAP.  Furthermore, when committing to 
the possible engagement of a CM over U.S. soil it is even more important to be 
able to visual identification of the track to ensure that it is not mistaken for a 
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c. Force Readiness  
 
Figure 5.   Objectives Hierarchy, Sub-function Force Readiness  
 
Whenever possible it is important to have the right force, assigned 
to the right mission, at the right time and place and with the right equipment.  
When it comes to the security of the nation, every human soul should hold the 
same value for protection as every critical asset.  The ideal system would have 
the ability to provide full, 360 coverage of the nation from CM attacks outside our 
coasts and borders.  Ideally the system should be capable of the most rapid 
response by providing a GBAD posture that is concurrently at a high state of 
alert.  In cases of accurate and actionable intelligence or NSSE’s, the system will 
provide for a force that is pre-designated to the right mission, at the right time 
and place and with the right equipment.  And finally the system should provide for 
the overwhelming destruction of the CM with a defensive missile inventory 
capable of expending two U.S. missiles per every one CM. 
 
 
Goal: State of 
readiness capable of 





(2 GBAD missile 
per 1 CM) 
Goal: GBAD design 
with interlocking 
fields of fire capable 
of total U.S. 
protection from CM 






Metric: All CM’s 
engaged with no 
depletion of missile 
inventory 
Metric: Length of 









d. Operational Feasibility  
 
Figure 6.   Objectives Hierarchy, Sub-function Operational Feasibility 
 
The optimal GBAD system will be reliable, have redundant 
communications and maintenance procedures which allow for 24/7/365 
continuous operations in all types of conditions.  The GBAD system should be 
compatible with other sensor and shooter systems and be capable of full time 
operations in a joint environment.  The GWOT is a war without an end in sight.  
Therefore we will assume that any GBAD system designed to provide for the CM 
defense of North America will need to be permanent.  The ideal system will be a 
cost effective system that will require a low amount of actual crews actually 
operating and maintaining the equipment.  The system should be capable of 
being operated out of existing C2 nodes established for HLD.  Finally, the system 
should be as non-disruptive to the civilian populace as possible.  Optimal 
emplacement of the system should be such that it does not intrude on privately 
owned land or public access areas. 
H. CURRENT DEFENSE DESIGNS 
GBAD coverage in phase three “Defeat” can be utilized to provide two 
general types of air defense; point defense and area defense.  Point defense is 
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designed to protect specific critical and geopolitical assets.  Area defense is 
designed to provide a general scanning capability over broad areas of terrain. 
1. Point Defense 
Point defense is a specific type of defense designed to protect specific 
critical or geopolitical assets from air threats along specific Air Avenues of 
Approach (AAA).  The concept of operations for the GBAD point defense is to 
provide a “last line” of defense to protect specific assets, as well as the defending 
force, from all types of air threats.  This type of defense is adequate for both 
critical assets and high profile events.  This concept only provides defense for the 
populace which may, by chance occupy the surrounding areas near the specific 
defended assets.  Successful employment of this concept requires actionable 
intelligence about a known and likely threat and may require a reasonable 
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Figure 7.    Point Defense 
 
This type of point defense is adequate if the enemy intends to continue to 
attempt efforts of mass devastation and destruction designed to impact the daily 
operations of major sections of the U.S. by taking out key financial, military, 
political or energy assets.  Point defense is ideal for critical assets and planned 
NSSE’s. 
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2. Area Defense 
Area GBAD is a concept designed to provide interlocking fires over vast 
amounts of terrain utilizing both sensor and shooter resources in order to provide 
protection from all types of air threats.  This system is more expansive than point 
defense and it is designed to protect against a more random threat.  This concept 
provides for a greater degree of protection to the U.S. populace.  Area defense is 
not designated to specific critical assets but may consequently provide protection 
for assets which are located within the design.  In addition the force protection 
provided by area defense would also be limited to the coincidental location of 
such forces.  The area defense design could also augment the sensor and 
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Figure 8.    Area Defense 
 
The U.S. has a passive capability to provide area defense based on good 
intelligence and ability to interdict, intercede and engage a threat prior to launch 
of the attack. We have an active capability to provide point defense for critical 
assets based on the prospect of good intelligence and our ability to intercept, 
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intercede and engage the threat before and after launch due to designated air 
and ground sensors, Combat Air Patrols (CAP)’s and a formidable GBAD. 
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III. MODELING ANALYSIS 
Developing a strong CM defense system requires that two critical criteria 
are met. The employment of an optimal system should support the defense of 
critical assets and the general populace equally.  As stated before, the GBAD 
role in point defense is specifically designed for the protection of critical assets 
and special events, but does not adequately cover areas surrounding the general 
populace. GBAD augmentation in area defense could provide an equal amount 
of CM defense across the coastlines and borders which encompass both critical 
assets and the general populace.  In this chapter we will use game theory to 
prove that GBAD is an important element that strengthens a point defense to 
such an amount that it makes critical assets a non-favorable target for terrorist air 
strikes.  We will demonstrate that adding a viable GBAD system to an area 
defense posture will provide the same results for terrorists who may wish to strike 
more random areas of the U.S.  However, a strong CM defense can not be a 
complete defense by merely including GBAD systems in an area defense design.  
Such a defense needs to incorporate systems which are capable of meeting the 
objectives outlined in chapter II; wide area surveillance, positive combat 
identification, force readiness and operational feasibility.  We will evaluate three 
GBAD systems (current, proposed and conceptual) and rate them according to 
their ability to meet these objectives.  Our emphasis in scoring these systems will 
favor that which provides the best defense for critical assets and the general 
populace from a no-notice CM threat.  The total CM defense system is one that is 
properly employed and includes the requisite capabilities to detect, defend and 
defeat the CM threat. 
A. DEFINING THE GAME 
In this chapter we present an analytical framework utilizing the Game 
Theory methodology describing concurrent choices by two adversaries – United 
States vs. Terrorists – in a conflict situation.  Game theory will provide a basis for 
each participant to decide what strategy to utilize.  The game will be played 
simultaneously employing a primary competitive strategy for each player with no 
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opportunities for cooperation.  The gaming matrix will be formulated, as modeled 
in Philip Straffin’s Game Theory and Strategy, as a constant sum equivalent to a 
two-person zero-sum game.19  A zero-sum game is one in which the payoffs for 
the two players under any strategy pair sum to zero; that is when one player 
wins, the other loses.20   
B. QUESTIONED TO BE ANALYZED: 
As the U.S. continues to focus on building a strong air defense around 
critical assets and infrastructure, will the terrorists shift their strategy of 
committing air attacks on critical assets to attacking less well fortified targets in 
order to achieve a higher probability of a successful terror strike? 
C. THE PLAYERS 
Terrorists are non-state actors who are not bound by government rule, 
general military rules of engagement or military law.  Given this circumstance the 
terrorists may choose to apply strategies that do not coincide with conventional 
combat tactics.  The terrorists may choose to continue to use airborne vehicles 
as weapons in order to target critical U.S. assets.  If the terrorists assume that 
the U.S. will increase their air defense posture around critical assets to thwart 
that strategy, they may deem that strategy as too risky and seek a new strategy.  
The terrorists may assume less risk in attempting to attack softer and less well 
defended targets in random areas along the U.S. coast and borders and thereby 
assume the probability of better success in engaging softer targets. 
The U.S. can continue to build a robust air defense posture around critical 
assets under the assumption that the terrorists will continue to choose a strategy 
of damaging the U.S. major financial, military and energy resources by way of air 
attack.  The U.S. may also assume that the terrorists may adapt to a formidable 
point defense around critical assets and thereby deem it too risky to attempt to 
attack a target with little to no likely payoff.  This could lead the U.S. to assume 
that the terrorists may achieve a higher payoff by executing a successful attack 
                                            
19 Philip D. Straffin. Game Theory and Strategy. The Mathematical Association of America. 
1993, 65-67  
20 Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and Thomas J. Sanders. Naval Operations 
Analysis. Naval Institute Press. 1999, 47 
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on smaller targets thereby achieving a less payoff with less risk of failure.  In 
response to the terrorist’s adaptive strategy, the U.S. could choose to build a 
robust GBAD which covers larger areas and provides an in depth air defense 
coverage in support of air assets providing air defense of the larger regions along 
our coasts and borders. 
D. PLAYERS STRATEGIES 
The below Strategy Matrix indicates the rankings given to both player’s 
respective strategies based on their intersecting outcomes.  The matrix has been 
given a scale of 1 to 4, with 4 being the most preferred and 1 being the least 
preferred ranking strategy each player would choose to take.  Of note, each 
player is not given the opportunity to know beforehand what strategy the other 
player would choose. Therefore, each player has chosen its best strategy to take 
in order to achieve the stated objective as described below in Figure 9 for 
reaching a high probability of success.     
      
    
 
 
Figure 9.     U.S. / Terrorists Strategy Matrix 
Player I – U.S. strategies  
A – In-depth active air defense posture establishing “point” defense for 
designated critical assets. 
B – Several pod-like defense resources establishing “area” defense with 
interlocking fields of fire for the general populace along U.S. borders and 
coastlines. 
Player II – Terrorists strategies 















C – Critical Assets    D – Random Strikes 
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B – Execute random attacks on soft targets, e.g., general populace, 
schools, malls, etc… 
1. Point Defense 
AC     U.S. establishes a Point Defense with a multi-tier AMD posture 
that includes dedicated GBAD resources; Terrorists will attempt to strike critical 
assets within U.S. territory. 
AD    U.S. establishes a Point Defense with a multi-tier AMD posture 
that does not include GBAD resources; Terrorists conduct random strikes against 
specific soft targets identified as having significant value/impact. 
BC    U.S. establishes an Area Air Defense that includes a proposed 
deployable GBAD resource available to support U.S. mission directive (NSSE). 
Terrorists will attempt to attack critical assets or events on U.S. soil.  
BD    U.S. establishes an Area Air Defense that has no GBAD resource 
available to support U.S. mission directive (NSSE).  Terrorists conduct random 
attacks against specific soft targets identified as having significant value/impact. 
2. Values Assessment of Both Players Strategies 
AC: (4, 1) = If U.S. assumptions are correct in assessing that Terrorists 
will continue to strike critical assets, then the additional element of GBAD 
resources has the greatest value by providing an additional “last line” of Air 
Defense against a CM attack.  Therefore, we assigned the greatest payoff (4) to 
the U.S. and the least payoff (1) to the Terrorists - AC strategy. 
BC: (3, 2) = If the Terrorist choose to attack critical assets from the air 
then U.S. Air and proposed GBAD resources will be allocated to provide AMD 
against a CM threat.  Therefore, we assigned the second greatest payoff (3) to 
the U.S. and the second least payoff (2) to the Terrorists - BC strategy. 
BD: (2, 3) = If the Terrorists shift their strategy to conduct random strikes 
against specific soft targets within the U.S., the U.S. AMD posture does not 
incorporate a “last line” GBAD to defend against a no-notice CM strike.  
Therefore, we assigned a lower payoff (2) to the U.S. and the second greatest 
payoff (3) to the Terrorists - BD strategy. 
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AD: (1, 4) = If the Terrorists alter their strategy to conduct random strikes 
against non-specific soft targets in the U.S., there is no proposed GBAD in the 
AMD posture to defeat the CM attack.  Therefore, we assigned the lowest payoff 
(1) to the U.S. and the greatest payoff (4) to the Terrorist - AD strategy.  
3. United State’s Supplementary Strategies 
It is important to acknowledge that strategies “BD” and “AD” do not 
implicate a complete lack of CM defense, but rather a lack of the last line GBAD 
defense to augment the AMD posture surrounding the nation.  The U.S. does 
employ air and maritime operations which incorporate both sensor and shooter 
assets capable of defeating a CM threat if given proper actionable intelligence 
and enough time to locate and identify the threat.  NORAD has a continuous 
cycle of Combat Air Patrol’s (CAP) which are capable of engaging air threats 
when they are aware of their location and intent. For purposes of this thesis we 
will only be analyzing the strategies (using them in the gaming payoff matrix) 
from the perspective of employing GBAD to provide a “point” and “area” defense, 
as described in chapter II of the current defense design. 
E. THE GAME OF THE STATUS QUO 
Based on the assumptions and the strategies depicted for each of the two 
players, the game develops as represented by the payoff matrix presented in 
Figure 10.  In this particular matrix, both players’ payoffs (the Row player being 
the U.S. and the Column player being the Terrorists) have been given 
independently to one another. That is, when the U.S. gains the Terrorist loses, 
and vice versa; with 4 being the best and 1 being the worst.  Therefore, since the 
two players’ payoffs are independent of each other it will be assumed that each 
player bases his own decisions on his payoffs alone; thus, drawing conclusions 
on the bases of the concept known as the Principle of Rationality, meaning every 
player wishes to come out as well off as possible.21 
 
                                            
21 Saul Stahl. A Gentle Introduction to Game Theory. American Mathematical Society, 1999 
v. 13. 
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Terrorist Action  
C.  Atk Critical Assets D. Random Strikes  
A.  Pt. Defense (4 ,   1) (1  , 4) U.S. 
Action B.  Area Defense (3 ,   2) (2 , 3) 
Figure 10.   U.S. vs. Terrorists Action Matrix 
 
As a result of the expected payoffs, it is determined that a Nash 
Equilibrium exists with the implementation of Strategies B and D, where the U.S. 
chooses the approach to establish an Area Defense for smaller, softer assets, 
against the Terrorists action of choosing to execute attacks on random soft 
targets (less defensible areas, e.g., populace, schools, malls, etc), having a 
payoff of (2, 3).  In this particular gaming matrix, in which no communication is 
occurring between both players, the Nash Equilibrium sets at strategies BD 
indicating that neither player can freely improve their position unilaterally.   
This approach taken from each player indicates the likely outcome when 
decisions are made without communication, thus, representing the status quo.  
More importantly, this strategy of attack taken from the Terrorists player 
illustrates a higher expected payoff probability; an approach that may offer a 
higher probability of success.  Given the concerted efforts set by the U.S. to 
concentrate their AMD resources around critical assets, it is reasonable to 
assume that the terrorists will alter their strategy of attacking large critical assets 
to softer target strikes in which the U.S. AMD counter measures may be less 
robust or non-existent.   
By implementing GBAD that is capable of protecting critical assets as well 
as the overall general populace into our HLD strategy against a terrorist random 
strike strategy, as Figure 11 below depicts, we can reduce the likelihood that 
terrorists will execute a successful CM strike on the U.S.  A depiction of the 
players Security Values and Maximin and Minimax strategies have been 









Figure 11.    GBAD illustration / emphasis 
 
 
F. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION 
In determining the alternatives for GBAD systems designed to defend the 
nation against a CM attack we have conducted research on three pre-existing, 
viable alternatives.  The first is the Joint Air Defense Operations Center (JADOC) 
which currently supports the N/NC HLD with GBAD in the National Capital 
Region (NCR).  The JADOC is currently funded and operational.  Secondly, we 
looked at the Joint Air Defense Operations- Homeland (JADO-H), which is a 
concept designed to support the DHACMD mission for N/NC.  JADO-H is a 
concept that is currently under review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) for approval and funding.  The final alternative system we look at is the 
Low Cost Interceptor (LCI) program, which is a concept designed to provide full 
time, 360 CM defense coverage in support of HLD.  LCI is a concept design 
which is not currently funded for fielding.  We measure the capabilities of these 
alternatives against the metrics outlined in the needs analysis to defeat a CM 
attack, which are wide area surveillance, positive combat identification, and rapid  
response.  We then measure the systems against the operational feasibility 
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The JADOC is a HLD resource designed to detect, track, identify any 
possible enemy air threats directed at the NCR, and if necessary, engage such 
threats with military force.  Command and control for the JADOC falls under the 
command of NORAD’s Continental U.S. Region (CONR).  The JADOC is 
comprised of U.S. Air Force and Army service members working in conjunction 
with one another to collaborate information from their respective services sensors 
and shooters to conduct track correlation, deconfliction and command and 
control.  Operators can track information from a family of Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), as well as military ground based, elevated and airborne 
sensors and Electric Optical/ Infrared (EO/IR) cameras.  GBAD operational 
responsibility in the JADOC belongs to the 263rd AAMDC, National Guard (NG). 
The JADOC is a static asset designed to protect critical assets in the nation’s 
capital.  They have a strong, multi-tiered capability to quickly elevate their alert 
status to detect and engage enemy air threats using fighter jets and Short Range 
Air Defense (SHORAD) weapons systems such as the avenger and AMRAAM 
variant missile systems.  JADOC operations rely on the use of limited and 
restricted fly zones around the NCR.  GBAD systems in the JADOC Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) maintain a 24/7/365 capability to provide point defense of 
designated critical assets.  The system requires limited and/or full manning, 
depending of the state of alert, to operate properly.  Figure 12 provides a general 
(not to scale due to classification) depiction of air defense coverage in the NCR. 
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Figure 12.    Example of JADOC air defense coverage22 
 
The JADOC is an optimal system for deterring and defeating hostile 
aircraft threats in the NCR.  However, this system relies heavily on ground based 
and elevated sensors which are upward and outward looking.  While this is more 
than adequate for detecting high flying aircraft, the CM may pose a greater 
challenge to these sensors.  The 2006 Lincoln Lab Study showed a baseline 
performance in an urban defense environment against a CM for both fighters and 
SAM’s to be poor or inadequate, though it should be noted that the performance 
for declared threats or hijacked aircraft to be good or adequate.23  The study also 
demonstrated that the augmentation of downward looking sensors such as the 
Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS), not improving the performance for the fighter jet, improved the GBAD 
performance from poor to adequate.24 
2. JADO-H 
The JADO-H is a system concept intended to utilize the capabilities of 
GBAD weapons systems and sensors, which have already been fielded, and 
                                            
22 Picture from USASMDC/NORAD JADO-H Joint Test and Evaluation, nomination briefing 
working version 16.0. Retrieved from SMDC Future Warfare Lab on16 November 2006 
23 L.O. Upton, MIT, Lincoln Labs, 2006. Slide 17 
24 Ibid. Slide 18 
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tailor their CONOPS to support the D-HACMD mission.  JADO-H would employ 
such shooter systems as the Avenger, SLAMRAAM, and Patriot missile systems.  
This system can be used for two essential functions.  First the JADO-H could be 
designated to provide GBAD support in emergency or critical air emergency 
situation.  For JADO-H to be functional in this scenario it would require timely and 
actionable intelligence of a known or declared threat.  Additionally JADO-H would 
have to have previously determined areas for emplacement of the system.  
Secondly, this system is ideal for NSSE’s and/or even multiple, simultaneous 
NSSE’s. Figure 13 is an example of the JADO-H, NSSE deployment capability. 
 
 
Figure 13.   JADO-H deployed to provide CMD for Superbowl25 
 
An example of such a scenario took place in June of 2004, when Ronald 
Reagan’s funeral occurred at the same time as the G-8 summit, both on U.S. 
soil.  The JADO-H concept, like the JADOC, is designed for point defense of 
                                            
25 Picture from USASMDC/NORAD JADO-H Joint Test and Evaluation, nomination briefing 





specific, predetermined assets and requires a moderate amount of time for 
preparation and deployment of the system. Unlike the JADOC however, the 
JADO-H will utilize farther reaching sensors like the Relocatable Over The 
Horizon Radar (ROTHR) which provides high reliability and cost effective wide 
area coverage from 500 miles inland to 1,500 miles off the U.S. coastline.26 




Figure 14.    JADO-H Wide Area Surveillance Capability27 
 
The JADO-H system provides an essential ability to counter the CM threat 
and link with and augment other joint and interagency sensors and shooters.  
The current JADO-H timeline proposes a material solution for 2015.   
3. LCI 
The Low Cost Interceptor is a concept design developed by SMDC’s 
Technical Interoperability and Matrix Center (TIMC) as a CM (as well as other 
asymmetric air threats) defense system that optimally will provide 360 coverage 
of the U.S. utilizing several small missile silos spread across our borders and 
                                            
26 Raytheon brochure on ROTHR capabilities in support of Homeland Defense.  Retrieved  
from SMDC FWC labs, Redstone Arsenal, AL. 16 November, 2006. 
27 Ibid. 









coastlines.  The weapons system will be compatible with existing sensor and 
shooter systems and will utilize JLENS and High Altitude Sensors (HAS) to 
achieve a downward looking Wide Area of Surveillance.  The LCI system is 
capable of 24/7/365 operations and does not require constant manning to 
maintain and operate the system and can be operated out of one central C2 
node such as NORAD or CONR.  The LCI concept is system that is static, can 
provide area CM defense and can react to a CM threat in a manner of minutes 
once it is positively identified as hostile target.  LCI’s are a cheaper brand of 
missile and can be augmented by an even smaller variant, the Merlin.  Each 
missile silo can hold 16 interceptors which are capable of engaging CM’s.  LCI 
and Merlin missiles are more maneuverable than standard Patriot and 
SLAMRAAM missiles.  The concept design allows for silos-approximately 30-40 
for total U.S coverage- to be emplaced in non-obtrusive government and publicly 
owned land and could currently cover about 80% of the U.S.28  Figure 15 depicts 
and approximation of how the silos would be employed along the coasts. 
 
Figure 15.   LCI Emplacement along U.S. Coastlines/Borders29 
 
                                            
28 Interview with LCI, program lead engineer Dave Tillson, SMDC, TIMC, Redstone Arsenal, 
AL. 16 November 06. 




Figure 16 demonstrates how the LCI could be employed in support of the 
homeland defense mission and how the system could be integrated with existing 
sensors and operated from one central C2 node. 
 
Figure 16.   LCI in Homeland Defense Role30 
 
G. SCORING 
We will base the following scoring criteria, shown in Tables 1 and 3, on 
our assessment of the respective systems ability to detect, track, ID and engage 
the CM threat at a reasonable distance in a reasonable amount of time.  This is 
our own assessment based on our research of the systems operational designs.  
Since some systems are not fielded we are not basing our research on empirical 
data or test results, but rather on the assumption that the systems sensors and 
shooters will operate as intended.   
We use a scoring system of either, “Go” (G), or “No Go” (NG) to evaluate 
each alternative systems ability to meet the metrics outlined in the objectives 
hierarchy in chapter II.  This is a simple three point system (0, .5 and 1) which 
assigns a G for a system that has the ability to meet the systems specific 
objective and a NG for a system that does not meet the objective criteria.  A 
system with a limited ability to meet the objectives receives a G/NG.  We 
calculate the scores with the highest score reflecting the system that is most 
optimal in meeting the requirements in the objectives hierarchy to defeat the CM 
attack in a “last line” defense role. 
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Table 1.    Detail, Difference, and Impact of Systems 
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Operates for 
minimal $ (less is 
better) & 
minimum 
manning (less is 
better) 
# of complaints & 
media attention 
(less is better) 
2 2.5 4  
 RECAP (Total) 6.0 9.5 11.0 
Table 3.    Raw Data Matrix 
 
The scoring data indicates that the current system (JADOC) scores lowest 
against the CM threat.  There are several factors attributing this score, but it is 
important to reiterate that this system was not tailored around the CM threat and 
that it scores much higher against other irregular air attacks.  Some of the 
primary reasons for the low score for the JADOC system are that most of its 
static radars are upward looking.  Also, 24/7/365 operations require full time 
manning with crews to bring the system to operational status.  Most of the 
shooter weapons systems for the JADOC are shorter range weapons and not 
designed to engage the CM threat from a distance.  Finally the JADOC operates 
in an urban environment which limits its ability to engage CM’s at low altitudes, 
and in some cases the weapons have been spotted locally and caused a stir in 
the populace. 
The Deployable JADO-H scored second highest, because it was designed 
as the answer to the JADOC’s issue of CM engagement.  JADO-H has the long 
range surveillance capabilities necessary to detect and identify a CM in a timely 
manner which allows for a safe engagement.  Two issues that hinder the JADO-
H is that it is not designed to respond to a no notice CM threat.  JADO-H requires 
time to be deployed to a specific asset and is designed for point, not area, 
defense.  JADO-H is a great system for the CM defense of NSSE’s. However, 
since NSSE’s will be its most probable mission assignment it is not likely to avoid 
public attention. 
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The LCI system scored highest, because it meets the requirements of all 
sub-functions in order to successfully engage the CM threat.  LCI had a wide 
area surveillance capability, it requires no actual manning and can be operated 
from a centralized C2 node.  The system is designed to be compatible with all 
existing communications architecture.  One of the best features of the LCI 
system is that it requires a minimum number of silos and can provide almost full 
360 coverage of the U.S. without intruding on privately owned land.  The overall 
best feature is that it is a system that will be ready to detect, identify and engage 
the no notice CM threat in a matter of minutes. 
Our recommendation is to sustain the JADOC operations and continue to 
pursue the JADO-H system for NSSE support, but we recommend strong 
consideration for the LCI concept design as it is the system that is the most 
capable of providing a total U.S. CM defense and could be brought to FOC in 
time to meet the pending CM challenge. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we have examined one specific threat of many, which 
terrorists may choose to employ to bring harm to the U.S.  The cruise missile 
threat is real and viable.  We have demonstrated the characteristics of the CM 
which make it an attractive weapon for our enemies.  CM’s are small, fast, can fly 
under the scope of most ground based radars, and can be programmed to 
maneuver in and around terrain.  While there are many barriers which could 
thwart a CM attack before it ever becomes a reality, our concern was focused on 
the idea that the terrorists may elude all first line detection efforts.  Our concern 
was focused on the last line of defense which we have shown here to be the 
Ground Based Air Defense effort.  Thus we have shown the need for an effective 
GBAD weapon system that can both detect the CM as well as match or outrun 
the CM capabilities. 
We have illustrated that it would not be difficult for our enemies to acquire 
a low grade CM and to modify its navigational capabilities with off the shelf GPS 
technology.  We have depicted a scenario portraying the method by which a 
terrorist organization could possibly bring a CM within range of the U.S. We know 
that if a CM does come within range of the U.S., and is capable of a launch, that 
we only have a matter of minutes to react.  Therefore it is critical to have a 
weapons system that is capable of 24/7/360 vigilant surveillance.  This system 
must be able to work with the entire family of joint and interagency sensors and 
shooters. Most importantly however, is the systems ability to react quickly to the 
CM threat and engage it outside of U.S. soil. 
The Department of Defense as well as NORAD and NORTHCOM have 
recognized the reality of the CM threat and have taken steps toward 
implementing a GBAD system capable of countering the threat.  Their current 
plans however, only plan for the shifting and redistribution of previously funded 
weapons systems.  Current systems in place such as the JADOC provide good 
coverage against a declared or a hijacked air threat, but do not have a strong CM 
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capability.  NORAD’s Current proposed answer to that is the development of the 
JADO-H which will serve as an excellent resource for CM defense.  However, 
both of these systems are only capable of providing point defense around critical 
assets or high visibility special events and do not cover the entire U.S. populace.  
While the JADO-H could tentatively provide CM defense anywhere in the U.S., it 
requires timely and actionable intelligence and would require time to deploy.  If a 
CM leaker slips through the wire, there would not be enough time for the JADO-H 
to react. 
Game theory has demonstrated that a rational planner who is seeking to 
launch a CM attack on the U.S. would not gain the level of success he would 
wish to achieve by attacking his normal high value targets, because he knows 
that this is what we expect and are planning for.  Therefore, a rational actor will 
seek to gain a higher probability of success by attacking softer and less well 
defended targets in larger, more general areas of the population.  This analysis 
proves the need for a stronger focus on a total area GBAD to support NORAD’s 
air defense operations. 
We have determined that for successful homeland defense against the 
CM threat there are four sub-functions which a GBAD system must perform.  The 
optimal GBAD system should be capable of wide area surveillance, it needs be 
be able to positively identify the track as a CM, most importantly it needs to be 
able to provide a rapid response, and it needs to be feasible to operate and 
maintain.  We have examined three alternatives for cruise missile defense in 
support of homeland defense and have made the following recommendation. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
The JADOC system has a track record of proven success against critical 
air threats in the NCR.  We would recommend no change in status to their 
current mission, but rather suggest that their support be augmented with a more 
robust GBAD CM capability.  The 263rd AAMDC will have its hands full mobilizing 




operations in the JADOC.  Therefore allocating more manpower to support the 
operations of other systems could prove to be very taxing on the unit and the 
soldiers. 
The JADO-H provides a good capability to augment NSSE’s and critical 
air defense emergencies.  However this system requires time to emplace and is 
not designed for the no notice threat.  In addition, if the 263rd AAMDC is to cover 
the entire HLD mission for GBAD than they will have and even more difficult time 
fielding both the JADOC mission and JADO-H.  In addition the JADO-H is not 
proposed to be Fully Operation Capable (FOC) until 2015 and if our threat 
assessment is correct the CM threat could be as little as five years away. We 
recommend pursuing the role of JADO-H in homeland defense but would add the 
recommendation of pre-designating missions to specific units.  Build site data 
books for specific critical assets and events and train the service member and 
the systems to be prepared to deploy in support of their HLD missions. 
In our estimation the LCI concept is a GBAD system which is capable of 
supporting all of the sub-functions we have deemed necessary for a viable CM 
defense against a leaker, or no notice CM threat.  The LCI with its use of the 
JLENS sensors supports a wide area and downward looking surveillance of the 
coastal and border areas surrounding the U.S.  The LCI is capable of 24/7/360 
operations just as the JADOC and JADO-H.  However, unlike the JADOC and 
JADO-H the LCI does not require the same amount of manning to perform its 
operations and maintenance.  All manning for the LCI- as far as ID and shooter 
mode- can be conducted at the C2 node and maintenance can be periodically 
conducted with contractor support. 
The LCI is capable of providing positive combat identification by sharing 
information and track amplifying data with sensors, such as JLENS which are 
already fielded.  The most attractive feature of LCI as a CM defense system is its 
ability to react to the CM threat in minutes and not days.  In all of our research 
this is the only conceptual system that provides protection from the no notice CM 
threat.  In addition, it is the only system that provides close to 360 coverage of 
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the entire U.S.  Although the LCI would likely be successful as a stand alone 
system, one of the major benefits would be its ability to augment existing air 
defense systems. 
The LCI also met all of the feasibility requirements.  Since the LCI is 
currently a conceptual system we assume some level of risk that it will be a 
completely reliable system other than to assume that the system will operate as 
proposed.  We know that the LCI will use existing technology to be compatible 
with other sensor and shooter systems.  The defense design of the LCI system 
allows for a reasonable number of missile silos to be place in unobtrusive areas 
throughout the country while still being able to engage CM’s at a distance well 
outside U.S. territory.  The LCI, by its very name, illustrates that the cost per 
missile is much less than that of most standard GBAD missiles.  Although the LCI 
has not been funded for fielding, the senior analysts’ estimate that the LCI could- 
if funded- be operational within two to three years, although we (the authors) 
assume risk in this assessment as the system has not been through the full Joint 
Test and Evaluation (JT&E) process.  However if this estimate is true, the LCI 
could be capable of being operational prior to the most aggressive estimate 
about the enemies capability to execute a viable CM attack.  Therefore we 
recommend that the LCI program be given due consideration to fund an 
operational JT&E and subsequently be funded for fielding in order to optimize the 

















APPENDIX A  
to Optimizing Ground Based Air Defense Assets and Forces in support of 
Homeland Defense: The Cruise Missile Threat 
A. U.S. WEAPONS CAPABILITIES 
Below is a more extensive depiction of the U.S. existing GBAD weapons 
system capabilities, as well as research in emerging technologies and processes 
which may increase U.S. ability to help detect and defend its homeland against 
any future Terrorists cruise missile type attack.   
1. Patriot Missile System 
 
 
The Patriot missile is an advanced, lethal, long-range Air Defense system 
capable of detecting and destroying incoming enemy tactical ballistic missiles, 
cruise missiles, or advanced aircraft.  Since the Gulf War in 1991, where Air 
Defense Patriot batteries first made their break-through performance by being 
heavily deployed and emplacing in areas of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
consequently, resulting in significantly countering Iraq’s Tactical Ballistic Missile 
launches throughout the duration of the conflict. 
Over a decade later, Patriot missile batteries were tested once again by 
Iraq’s Saadam Huessian forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to provide the 
critical services of shooting down enemy Scud missiles and protecting soldiers 
and civilians from a missile attack.  In OIF, U.S. forces increased their Air 
Defense weapons capability by being equipped with a newly Patriot Advanced 
Capability (PAC-3) missile which significantly enhanced their effectiveness of 
engaging and destroying a number of hostile surface-to-surface air missiles 
(SSAM) launched by Iraqi forces. 
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The Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System is designed to defeat the 
air threat of the 21st Century.31  “The range of the missile is 70km and maximum 
altitude is greater than 24km.  The minimum flight time is the time to arm the 
missile, which is less than 9 seconds, and the maximum flight time is less than 3 
½ minutes.32”  The exceptional characteristics of the Patriot weapons system 
make it a self-reliant deployable system 
Since its inception in 1981, the Patriot Air Defense missile system has 
been an effective, proven weapons system.  Over the years, the missile system 
has seen continuous advanced developmental improvements, especially in its 
advanced hit-to-kill technology arena.  The missile system is now featuring a 
sophisticated GEM+ missile which provides an upgraded capability to defeating 
cruise and ballistic missiles as well as air-breathing threats (ABT).  In addition, 
with new technology advances, the Patriot missile system is now capable of 
having 16 PAC-3 missiles loaded onto a launcher as compared to four in the 
PAC-2 missiles configuration. 
2. Stinger Missile System 
 
The Stinger Missile system is an extremely accurate short-range Air 
Defense weapon for the U.S. Army forces.  The Stinger missile is intended to 
give military ground forces an opportunity to counter enemy low-flying Air 
Breathing Threats (ABT) such as fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.  The missile features a quick-reaction  
 
                                            
31 Ground Based Air Defense – Patriot. Retrieved on 5 October 2006 from Ground Based Air 
Defense website:  http://www.gbad.org/gbad/amd_patriot.html  
32 Army Technology – Patriot Missile. Retrieved on 9 September 2006 from Army 
Technology website:  http://www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/   
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acquisition and tracking engagement that uses an infrared seeker to lock on to 
the heat in the aircraft’s engine exhaust, and will hit nearly anything flying below 
11,000 feet.33 
Some other distinct advantages that the Stinger missile has are such 
features as being a lightweight, mobile weapon.  It is a shoulder-launched, fire-
and-forget weapon, fired by one person, however usually operated by a two-man 
team.  The Stinger missile has a 3kg high explosive fragmentation warhead, with 
a maximum speed of Mach 2.2.34  The missile launcher is reusable and weighs 
about 35 pounds.  Additionally, the missile system uses a passive infrared seeker 
to engage its target, dissimilar from a radar guided missile that emits radio waves 
in order to identify its target. 
Essentially, Stinger missiles can engage targets flying as high as 11,500 
feet with a range of about 5 miles (8 km).  Consequently, if an enemy aircraft is 
less than 2 miles high and is visible to the ground troops as a shape, rather than 
a dot, then it is likely that the Stinger missile system will successfully acquire a 
confirm kill.35 
The tactics used by terrorists on September 11, 2001, high-jacking 
commercial planes to attack the United States in New York, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington, D.C. have since drastically revitalized the Missile Defense focus on 
utilizing the Stinger missile to counter such a threat, if employed again by 
terrorist.   
Operationally, low-flying enemy aircraft are typically a dilemma, posing an 
extreme threat factor for ground forces, consequently, performing operations 
such as dropping ordinance or strafing, conducting reconnaissance –  
 
 
                                            
33 Marshall Brain. “How Stinger Missiles Work,” Retrieved on 6 September  2006 from How 
Stuff Works website:  http://science.howstuffwoks.com/stinger.htm 
34 Army Technology – Air Defense Missile Systems.  Retrieved on 7 September 2006 from 




surveillance work or inserting, extracting and resupplying enemy forces.  Simply 
employing the Stinger missile to destroy these ABTs is the easiest way to 
remove the threat.  
3. Avenger Missile System 
 
 
As part of the Stinger weapons system, the Avenger is an Air Defense 
missile system designed to destroy enemy low-altitude and high-speed fixed or 
rotary-wing aircraft.  The system is a nimble light-weight, day/night, portable fire 
unit.  The missile system functions from a pedestal mounted High Mobility Multi-
purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) chassis and carries eight heat-seeking 
Stinger missiles inside two rapidly re-loadable pods mounted either side of the 
turret.  These pods have a range of elevation from -10 degrees to + 70 degrees 
with a missile reload time of eight missiles in less than four minutes.36 
During OIF, the Avenger missile system provided critical protection to 
forward and rear U.S. forces, most importantly command posts on advancing 
ground troops up to Baghdad, throughout the duration of the war campaign.  
Moreover, with its mounted .50-heavy caliber machine gun (mainly used for self-
defense), it can also provide protection to forces as it maneuvers into rocket firing 
position by suppressive fires.  Essentially, the Avenger system presents an 




                                            
36 Army Technology – Avenger. Retrieved on 9 September 2006 from Army Technology 
website:  http://www.army-technology.com/projects/avenger/  
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The Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile 
(SLAMRAAM) is the U.S. Army’s future short range AD weapons system.  The 
SLAMRAAM offers the Army an effective Air Defense protection capability 
against the emerging asymmetric aerial threats, cruise missiles and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs).  The SLAMRAAM fire unit consists of four to six ready-to-
fire AIM-120C-7 AMRAAMs mounted on an Army High Mobility Multi-Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV).37  The Raytheon AMRAAM AIM-120C missile is fitted with 
clipped fins that have a longer range (25 km intercept range) and a very high 
agility to counter targets making evasive maneuvers.38   
Continuous software upgrades have been made to the AMRAAM missile 
system, such as the added command destruct/self destruct capabilities, 
essentially improving the missile’s facility of intercepting cruise missiles and other 
unmanned aerial targets, over urban terrain.  Ultimately, this future missile 
defense system will provide U.S. military forces a rapidly deployable, all-weather, 
high fire power, stand-off AD weapons capability in defeating enemy aircraft, CM 
and UAV’s beyond the range of currently fielded Avenger and Stinger MANPADS 
fire units.39 
 
                                            
37 Ground Based Air Defense. SLAMRAAM – Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range 
Air to Air Missile.  Retrieved on 5 October 2006 from Global Security website:  
http://www.gbad.org/gbad/amd_slamraam.html  
38 Army Technology – Surface-Launched AMRAAM (SLAMRAAM/CLAWS) Medium-Range 
Air Defense System, USA. Retrieved on 5 October 2006 from Army Technology website:  
http://www.army-technology.com/projects/surface-launched/   
39 Ground Based Air Defense. SLAMRAAM.  
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5. Low Cost Interceptors (LCIs) 
 
 
Low Cost Interceptors can be a significant cost-effective added missile 
system to Joint Cruise Missile Defense, Joint Warfighting.  LCIs have a low cost 
requirement and are an addition to existing and future AD systems, namely to the 
PAC-3 and SLAMRAAM missile systems, therefore indicating a nominal logistical 
impact.  Conceptually, LCIs will have a longer range capability (150 km intercept 
range) ultimately improving inherent survivability, sustainability.40  Longer range 
of missile extends the Battlespace (20 to 150 km) allowing for flexibility, thus 
providing a greater in depth Area Air Defense coverage.  Moreover, LCIs are 
capable of incorporating a Single Integrated Air Picture; fundamentally, designed 
specifically for use with Elevated Sensor and Integrated Fire Control Network-
Centric systems on the Battlefield.41 
Notably, one potential missile designed for countering a CM threat is from 
the Netfires Compatible Interceptor (NCI) for CMD and Homeland Defense in 
Huntsville, Alabama.  The organization is currently demonstrating the Netfires 
Missile Launcher to the U.S. Army as a common launcher capable of being 
positioned and left independently at key locations throughout the United States.  
The Netfires launcher is intended to providing all functions necessary in a self-
sufficient, autonomous mode unit.42 
                                            
40 David Tilson. Low Cost Interceptor (LCI) Technology Integration Demonstration Program. 
Program Lead USASMDC, OTII. Presentation to North America Aerospace Defense Command. 
July 2004. 
41 Tilson. July 2004. 
42 David Tilson and Stephen Hutson. Netfires Compatible Interceptor for CMD and 
Homeland Defense. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Aero Thermo Technology, Inc. 
Huntsville, Alabama, September 8, 2006. 
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Figure 17.   Typical LCI Mission43 
 
                                            
43 David Tilson. Low Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD), Home-on-Home, Army Space 
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APPENDIX B  
to Optimizing Ground Based Air Defense Assets and Forces in support of 
Homeland Defense: The Cruise Missile Threat 
A. TERRORISTS CM WEAPONS CAPABILITIES 
Terrorists from rogue states are capable of building Cruise Missiles from 
available supplies of vast technological resources to attack the population 
sociable hubs and Critical Infrastructure sights of the United States.  Below is 
some additionally information on the CM type Terrorists weapons of choice as 
discussed in the main thesis document.   
1. Cruise Missiles (CM) 
 
  
Cruise Missiles are essentially small turbofan engines used to cruise to 
their targets.  CMs can take numerous trajectories; however, in general have two 
common flight patterns.  “The first pattern is for the missile to climb after launch 
and cruise at high level, at between 10-20 km altitude, and then to dive down to 
low level, at 10-200 m altitude, before running into the target.  The second 
pattern is for the cruise missile to fly at low level throughout the trajectory.  The 
missiles can change direction several times during a flight, and can be 
programmed to attack more than one target.44”   
As mentioned above, CMs can fly 500 to 1,000 mile (805 to 1,610 km) 
depending on the configuration and are very effective because they are very 
                                            
44 Jane’s Information Group. Cruise Missile Defense. Retrieved on 5 October 2006 from the 
Jane’s Information Group website:  
http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/news/jsws/jsws060927_1_n.shtml  
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difficult to detect, even with infrared detection, it still remains difficult because of 
the turbofan engines emitting little heat.45  
CM’s are inexpensive, easy-to-construct weapons that can be used to 
create shocking effect by terrorists, subsequently, could be employed as a WMD 
type threat.  The cruise missile’s sleek stability makes it a naturally easier and 
cheaper platform from which to carry out and scatter chemical and biological 
agents, giving it a lethality factor more than 10 times greater than that of a 




A missile treated with radar-absorbing material is detected at 
shorter range, so Air Defense forces have little time to react.47 
                                            
45 Marshall Brain. How Cruise Missiles Work. Retrieved on 9 September 2006 from How 
Stuff Works website:  http://science.howstuffworks.com/curise-missile.htm  
46 Michael C. Sirak and Daniel G. Dupont, “Expert: U.S. Not Prepared for Cruise Missile 
Attacks,” Inside Missile Defense, 23 Dec. 1998, 5. 
47 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat. National Air Intelligence Center NAIC-1031-0985-98. 
Retrieved on 10 September 2006 from NAIC website:  
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/part07.htm  
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APPENDIX C  
to Optimizing Ground Based Air Defense Assets and Forces in support of 
Homeland Defense: The Cruise Missile Threat – The U.S. vs. Terrorists modeling 
conflict situation. 
A. GAME THEORY TERMINOLOGY 
In comprehending this methodology describe in our thesis, it is important 
to define certain terms used when applying game theory that will be helpful to the 
reader in understanding our analysis: 
1. The payoff matrix of a game is the matrix wherein each row 
corresponds to a strategy of the maximizing player, each column corresponds to 
a strategy of the minimizing player, and the matrix entry is the payoff resulting 
from the strategy choices of that row and column. 
2. A play of the game is the choosing of a strategy by each player, 
i.e., a row and column of the payoff matrix, along with the awarding of the payoff 
which results. 
3. An optimal strategy for either player of a two-person zero-sum 
game is one which provides the best guarantee available to that player, i.e., a 
maximin strategy for the maximizing player or a minimax strategy for the 
minimizing player. 
4. The value of a game is the guaranteed payoff for each player, 
providing it is the same for each and providing each uses an optimal strategy. 
5. The solution of a two-person zero-sum game is an optimal strategy 
for each player and the numerical value of the game.48 
6. Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, 
one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change their  
 
 
                                            
48 Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and Thomas J. Sanders. Naval Operations 
Analysis. Naval Institute Press. 1999, 47 
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action.  Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them 
would lead that player to earn less than if the player remained with its current 
strategy. 
7. A simultaneous game is one in which all players make decisions or 
select a strategy without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by 
other players.  Even though the decisions may be made at different points in 
time, the game is simultaneous because each player has no information about 
the decisions of others; thus it as if the decisions are made simultaneously.  
Simultaneous games are represented by the normal form and solved using the 
concept of a Nash equilibrium.49 
                                            
49 Mike Shor. Game Theory Net. 2001-2006. Retrieved on 9 September 2006 from 
http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/Equilibrium.html 
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APPENDIX D  
to Optimizing Ground Based Air Defense Assets and Forces in support of 
Homeland Defense: The Cruise Missile Threat – The U.S. vs. Terrorists modeling 
conflict situation. 
A. PLAYERS SECURITY VALUES 
Having determined that neither the U.S. nor the Terrorists can improve by 
unilaterally moving from its dominant strategy, it becomes essential to analyze 
each player’s game to determine if there is the possibility of improving an 
outcome by playing one side’s game.  Figures 1 and 2 show the results of both 
the United States’ and Terrorists games.  In each game, the objective is for the 
player whose game is being analyzed to maximize its outcome while the 
opponent attempts to minimize the other player’s outcome.  The end result 
determines each player’s security value. 








U.S. objective – Maximize Outcome 
Terrorist objective – Minimize Outcome 
U.S. Security Value – 2 
 















Figure 1: Viewing internal U.S. Game 
    Big Tgts         Softer/Smaller Tgts 
Critical Assets     General Populace 
   Big Tgts         Softer/Smaller Tgts 









Terrorist objective – Maximize Outcome 
U.S. objective – Minimize Outcome 













Figure 2: Viewing internal Terrorists Game 
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APPENDIX E  
to Optimizing Ground Based Air Defense Assets and Forces in support of 
Homeland Defense: The Cruise Missile Threat – The U.S. vs. Terrorists modeling 
conflict situation. 
A. PLAYERS MAXIMIN AND MINIMAX STRATEGIES 
1. Analyzing U.S. Area Defense 
U.S. employing an Area Defense strategy against Terrorists Random 
Strikes strategy (noting no current U.S. GBAD resources existing) focusing on 
“Defeat” the CM attack while utilizing the U.S. expected payoffs. 
* A - AMD concentration around critical assets 





                                                                        Terrorists Attack  
            Big Targets Softer/Smaller Targets 
     C - Critical Assets D - General Populace  
                 min        
               A – Point Defense  4         1       1   
U.S.                  Maximin 
- Defeat   B – Area Defense  3         2       2       2  
       
max 4         2                
     Minimax 2 
 
U.S. can assure a payoff of at least 2, his maximin, by choosing strategy 
B.  Terrorists’ best guarantee, his minimax, is 2, using strategy D.  Hence, when 
the maximin and the minimax are the same, the resulting outcome is called a 
saddle-point.  If a game has a saddle-point, it gives the value of the game and 
the optimal strategies for both players by yielding the saddle-point payoff (2 for 
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U.S. Area Defense and 2 for Terrorists to conduct random strikes on 
softer/smaller targets).50  The value of the game together with its maximin and 
minimax strategies constitute the solution of the game.  
Without knowledge of the Terrorist’s strategy, a reasonable choice for U.S. 
is the maximin strategy, i.e., to employ an Area Defense concentrating on 
protecting the softer/smaller assets and guarantee a payoff of at least 2.  
2. Analyzing Terrorists Attack 
Terrorists instigating an attack against a limited U.S. Area Defense 
strategy (currently is not optimally implemented) focusing on achieving 
catastrophic, destructive and substantial damage to its adversary; utilizing its 
own expected payoffs. 
* A - AMD concentration around critical assets 
* B - AMD concentration around general populace 
 
 
            Terrorists Attack  
            Big Targets Softer/Small Targets 
     C - Critical Assets D - General Populace 
             max        
                A – Point Defense  1         4       4   
U.S.                  Minimax 
- Defeat    B – Area Defense  2         3       3       3  
 
     min 2         3                 
                 Maximin 3 
 
Terrorists can assure a payoff of at least 3, his maximin, by choosing 
strategy D.  U.S. best guarantee, his minimax, is 3, using strategy B.  Once more, 
a saddle-point exists in this strategy match signifying a 3 for the value of the 
game.  In this case, both players can guarantee at least this value by choosing 
their maximin and minimax strategies.   
                                            
50 Naval Operations Analysis, 49-50. 
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Without knowledge of the U.S. strategy, a reasonable choice for Terrorists 
is the maximin strategy, i.e., to attack softer/smaller targets and guarantee a 
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